




ARMED CONFLICT CHARACTERISTICS AND ITS EFFECTS ON FIRM EXIT1 
 




This paper uses two unique panel data sets to study the causal effect 
that different characteristics of the armed conflict have over firm exit 
in Colombia. Using a fixed effects estimation methodology at the plant 
level and controlling for the possible endogeneity of armed conflict 
through the use of instrumental variables, we find that the particular 
armed group that operates in a given region, the level of polarization 
of the conflict as well as the specific target of the attack impact in a 
differential manner the probability of firm exit. This poses important 
implications for policy recommendations and actions in the different 
regions of the country.  
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The high incidence of armed conflicts around the world has significantly increased the 
interest of academic research on the possible impact of violence on several outcomes of 
interest. Most of this research has focused on the direct impact that conflict has on its 
victims and on the households residing in conflict areas. The questions of interest in these 
studies include the impact of violence on forced migration, households’ consumption and 
investment patterns, general health of individuals and the levels of education attainment 
and labor decisions of children exposed to conflict, among others.2  
However, little attention has been given to the impact that conflict may have on firms’ 
decisions, performance and activities. Among the few studies that have addressed the 
problem of firm activity and civil conflict we find Barro (1991) and Alesina and Perotti 
(1996). Using cross-country data, both studies show a negative relationship between 
political instability and economic growth. Similarly, Gaviria (2002) showed that firms’ 
sales in Latin America grow at a lower rate if entrepreneurs believe crime rates are 
sufficiently high to interrupt business activities. This cross-country evidence, although 
suggestive, may suffer from omitted variable bias and reverse causality between poverty 
and conflict if not adequately controlled for.  Hence, recent studies have focused on single 
country information in order to reduce these estimation problems. For instance, Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003) used information in the Basque country to estimate the impact that 
terrorist activities have on GDP; Collier and Duponchell (2010) use a cross section of firm 
data and find negative consequences on employment and earnings in Sierra Leone. For 
Colombia three studies have analyzed this issue. Pshisva and Suarez (2010) established the 
negative impact that kidnaps have on firms’ investment decisions in Colombia. Rettberg 
(2008) conducts a survey to 1113 Colombian firms and find out that over 75% of them 





obtain evidence that suggests that armed conflict increases in a significant manner the 
probability of firm exit.   
This paper enriches the existing literature by estimating the effect that the different 
characteristics of armed conflict have on exit decisions of manufacturing firms. 
Specifically, this paper answers three questions of interest. The first one is whether the 
effect of the attacks depends on the armed group who commits it. Different armed groups 
have different ideologies, war strategies and normally target different objectives suggesting 
that its effect on entrepreneurial activities should also differ. The second question is how 
different levels of polarization of the conflict affect the probability of a firm leaving the 
market. In this paper, we construct an index in which higher values correspond to 
municipalities where there are fewer armed actors present. The armed conflict in highly 
polarized zones may differ from the one in municipalities with several armed groups 
present and hence firm’s decisions may also be dissimilar. The third and final question asks 
whether attacks targeted towards private property have a greater impact on firm exit 
decision than attacks targeted to generate fear to the civil population. 
  
 The answer to these three questions is important for several reasons. First, the study of the 
manufacturing sector is relevant for Colombia given that it represents approximately 15% 
of its GDP. However it is also relevant for other developing countries experiencing armed 
conflict given the importance that entrepreneurship and firms’ activities have on the 
economic performance of a country. Moreover, authors such as Iyigun and Rodrik (2006) 
and Munshi (2007) suggest that low levels of development are in part caused by low levels 
of entrepreneurship. Understanding how the different characteristics of armed conflict 
affects economic activity at the firm level could provide governments and NGOs with 
insights on how to reduce its impact on economic activity according to each regions 




This paper uses information from two unique panel data sets from Colombia that allow us 
to directly link firms´ activities with the specific characteristics of the armed conflict at the 
municipality level.3 The information on entrepreneurial activities used in the present study 
comes from the Annual Manufacturing Survey (AMS). This is a census of manufacturing 
plants with more than 10 employees or an annual production above 50.0004 dollars 
measured in 2005 prices for the period 1993-2005. Information on armed conflict is 
obtained from a yearly data set at the municipal level constructed by CEDE (Centro de 
Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico, Universidad de los Andes) which contains the 
number and type of attacks perpetrated by both guerilla and paramilitary groups in 
Colombia between 1988 and 2004. Our conflict measure will vary according to our 
question of interest. This information is further complemented with information on 
government deterrence measures. 
 
In all of these specifications we include firm fixed effects and take into account the possible 
endogeneity of our variables of interest, and thus we use instrumental variables technic in 
which contemporaneous armed conflict is instrumented with lagged government deterrence 
measures.5 As in Camacho and Rodriguez (2012) we find that armed conflict increases the 
probability of firm exit. More interesting we corroborate the hypothesis that this effect 
varies according to the specific characteristics of the conflict. Regarding the authors of the 
attacks we find that while attacks perpetrated by the paramilitary groups do not have any 
effect on firm exit decisions, attacks made by any of the two guerrilla groups have a 
positive and significant effect. The same is true, although in a smaller magnitude, for 
attacks made by common criminals. Finally, attacks whose perpetrator is unknown have an 
                                                            
3 Colombia has 31 states and 1120 municipalities within those states. 
4 Using the average exchange rate in 2005: 2300 pesos per US dollar. This is the exchange rate that will be 
used throughout the paper. 
5 The intuition for choosing these instruments is closely related with recent research by Angrist and Kugler 




important effect on firm exit. We find that greater levels of polarization increase the 
probability of firm exit decisions. However, this effect is not linear and after a certain 
threshold the effect starts to diminish. Finally, we find that attacks targeted to private 
property increases in a higher proportion the probability of firm exit that attacks targeted to 
the civil population.  
  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes a review of the 
papers relating conflict with economic activity in the international literature.  Section 3, 
describes the data used in the paper and includes some descriptive statistics. Section 4 
explains the empirical strategy, Section 5 summarizes the main results and Section 6 
concludes.  
2. Literature Review 
As mentioned before, most of the existing literature on the consequences of conflict on 
economic activity has focused on cross-country evidence at the aggregate level. The first 
studies undertaken by authors such as Barro (1991) and Alesina and Perotti (1996) focused 
on analyzing how political instability affected investment rates and economic growth at 
national levels. Using cross-country data and different definitions of political instability or 
conflict, these papers find a negative relationship between these variables and economic 
activity. Similarly, Collier (1999) estimates that during conflict periods countries’ growth is 
approximately 2.2% lower than during peaceful times.   
In a more recent study, instead of using macro level data at the country level, Gaviria 
(2002) used information provided by around 100 middle and top managers from the private 
sector in 29 different countries. Controlling for firms’ characteristics as well as for country 
fixed effects, the author finds that both perceived corruption and crime have a negative and 
significant effect on investment and employment growth at the firm level. Although the 
paper investigates both corruption and crime activity, it is worth noting the apparent 
importance that the former has compared to the latter. First, according to 53% of the 
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interviewed managers, crime is an obstacle for business, while 46% think corruption is an 
obstacle. Second, the study’s empirical strategy suggests that while corruption lowers sales 
growth by 30%, crime reduces it by 35%. Similarly, while corruption appears to have no 
effect over investment, crime reduces it by 16%. 
This cross-country evidence, although suggestive, may suffer from some limitations such as 
measurement error, omitted variable bias and reverse causality between poverty and 
conflict if not adequately controlled for.  Recent studies have tried to solve these problems 
using information regarding conflict in a single country in order to study its possible 
economic impact. Among these studies we find Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) who 
evaluate the economic effects that the ETA’s terrorist activity has imparted in the Basque 
Country since its outset in the early seventies. They find that the terrorist activity created a 
gap of almost ten percentage points between the actual and potential GDP per capita in the 
region.    
Even though there is a great potential for studying the effect of conflict in Colombia, 
Riascos and Vargas (2011) mention that there are few studies that estimate the impact that 
both violence and armed conflict have on economic growth. The first studies in the country 
such as Rubio (1995) estimated the economic costs of conflict through accounting 
techniques and concluded that the total costs of armed conflict and illegal activities in the 
country amounted to 15% of GDP. More recent research has used either time series 
information for the country (Vargas, 2003 and Cárdenas, 2007), or calibrated theoretical 
models to Colombian data (Mejia and Posada, 2006). However, all of these papers used 
aggregate level data such as GDP per-capita or its growth rate.  
To the best of our knowledge, the papers that relate conflict variables with firm level data 
for a single country are Camacho and Rodriguez (2011), Collier and Duponchell (2010), 
Pshisva and Suarez (2010) and Rettberg (2008). The former study is closely related to this 
one; it uses the same data set and empirical strategy, but evaluates the general effect of 
armed conflict on economic activity. The authors find that indeed armed conflict in 
Colombia increases the probability of firms exiting the market. They find that a one 
standard deviation increase in the number of guerrilla and paramilitary attacks in a 
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municipality increases the probability of plant exit in 5.5 percentage points or 0.28 standard 
deviations. This effect is stronger for younger manufacturing plants, with a smaller number 
of workers and low levels of capital. 
Collier and Duponchell (2010) uses information from a firm survey conducted by the 
World Bank in 2006 in Sierra Leone, finding that conflict reduces the number of employees 
that a firm hires and also the income they receive. Moreover, it appears that the less 
productive firms are the ones that are affected the most by the conflict. The latter paper 
carries out a survey to nearly 1,000 firms in Colombia’s six largest cities asking their 
managers how the armed conflict has influenced their operations. Through a descriptive 
methodology the author concludes that the armed conflict in Colombia affects its firms 
through channels such as transaction costs, investment, expansion opportunities and firm 
sales.  Pshisva and Suarez (2010) use firm level panel data comprising nearly 10,000 firms 
for the period 1996-2002 and combine it with information on the number of kidnappings at 
the state level in Colombia. The authors estimate the effect that kidnaps have on firms’ 
investment decisions under an OLS framework with fixed effects at the firm level. They 
find that a one-standard deviation increase in firm-targeted kidnappings reduce the 
investment rate of the average firm from 0.29% to -0.28% of total assets. The authors 
suggest that the channel through which the effect of kidnaps is transmitted to investment is 
fear and not demand costs or credit constraints.   
Finally Rettberg (2008) through a detailed survey to 113 Colombian firms located in 6 
cities find out that the armed conflict in Colombia has negatively affected them. In 
particular she finds that the conflict increases indirect operational cost. Moreover, the 
uncertainty generated by the attacks, kidnaps and threats has decreased their investment in 
research, technology and in hiring more laborers.  
Even though previous research has studied the impact of armed conflict on economic 
activity; only Camacho and Rodriguez (2011) employ data as detailed as the one we use in 
this paper. As it was previously mentioned, we are able to construct a panel data set at the 
plant level for all manufacturing firms in the country for a period of ten years. The special 
and unique characteristics of the data used as well as the estimation strategies makes the 
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present paper a contribution to the literature. Moreover, the impact of different 
characteristics of the armed conflict on firm exit decisions has not been studied before. 
3. Data 
In order to answer our research questions we use Colombian violence and plant level data. 
Colombia has two detailed and unique data sets that will allow us to study in depth how 
armed conflict affects entrepreneurial activity.  
3.1 Annual Manufacturing Survey (AMS) 1993-2005:  
The Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey (AMS) has been conducted by the National 
Department of Statistics, DANE since 1982.  This is an ongoing census of industrial plants 
with more than 10 employees or a production above 50.000 dollars measured in 2005 
prices.  The data set allows constructing an unbalanced panel of plants by industry sectors 
over an extended period of time. We will use annual information by plant on: wages and 
benefit payments, investments, value added of production and we construct a measure of 
entry and exit of manufacturing plants.   
The information we use in this paper relates to the years 1993-2004. We start our panel in 
year 1993 because only after this year there is information about location (municipality) of 
the plant. Moreover, in 1992 the National Department of Statistics changed the coding of 
the plants and even though one could try to identify each plant of the new survey with past 
information some observations are lost and the methods are not a hundred percent reliable, 
as documented by Eslava et al. (2004). With these restrictions in mind, we obtain a non-
balanced panel including 12,714 plants during the period 1993-2004, accounting for 93,188 
observations. These plants are located in 296 municipalities out of the 1,120 Colombian 
municipalities. The observations are well spread within the territory, although of course, 
most plants are located in big cities such as Bogota, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, and 
Bucaramanga, concentrating almost 65.23% of the sample. The remaining plants are 
located in 28 states of the 32 states in Colombia.  
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We find a stable distribution of plants across years, with an average of approximately 7,765 
plants out of which 452 exit each year. This corresponds to approximately 6% of all 
manufacturing plants in Colombia.  An important fact in our definition of exit should be 
noted. The variable exit takes the value of one if we stop observing the plant in a given 
period and do not observe it again in the sample, and it is zero otherwise. However, as 
mentioned, the AMS is carried out to all plants with more than ten employees or with a 
production of above a given range, and hence one could think that a plant that contracts to a 
smaller scale could be erroneously declared as a plant that left the market. However, we 
believe this is not the case for three reasons. First, the Statistics Department continues to 
follow any plant that decreases the number of workers below 10 until this condition of less 
than 10 employees persists for more than 3 years. This will decrease the error of declaring a 
plant as if it exited the market when it only temporarily contracted. Second, we only 
assume the firm exists if we never see the plant in the survey again, so we allow for the 
possibility of plants that are not followed for a year but then reappear in the sample with the 
same identification number. Third, it is more likely that an erroneous exit declaration of a 
plant will occur for those plants with a lower number of workers. Hence, to make sure that 
we are not erroneously capturing such cases as exits, we carry out robustness checks in the 
empirical exercises, dropping plants that have less than 10 employees or an annual 
production of less than 50.000 dollars measured in 2005.6  
In Table 1 we include descriptive statistics coming from the AMS for our dependent 
variable, plant exit, and for each of the control variables used in the empirical exercises 
including wages and benefit payments, investments and value added of production. The 
table reports information on the sub-sample of plants where there is no missing 
information.7 Wages and investments are 91% and 67% of total value added respectively. 
We also report the descriptive statistics for our estimated measure of productivity. 
                                                            





Specifically, we ran a regression of capital and labor on output, and assuming a log 
linearized Cobb-Douglas production function, we calculate productivity as the Solow 
residual. This measure has a mean value of zero and a standard deviation of 1.09.  
As it was mentioned, the AMS is a census of all manufacturing plants and hence we believe 
that this data base does not have much bias in terms of firm selection. Two facts give us 
additional confidence on the accuracy and completeness of the information in this data set. 
First, Law 79 of October 1993 requires firms to fill out any survey provided by DANE.  
Second, every year DANE verifies with Confecamaras8 to send forms to new firms that 
qualify into the AMS, firms that will potentially enter into the panel receive pre-surveys to 
verify their characteristics to enter into the sample.  
  
3.2.Armed Conflict Data Base 1993-2004:  
The Colombian conflict is one of the longest ongoing domestic confrontations in the world, 
surpassed in length only by the Israeli-Palestinian and the Indian-Pakistani conflicts. There 
are three main irregular armed groups acting inside its borders during the period we study. 
Specifically, there are two guerrilla organizations known as the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) both of which even 
though originated in communist ideas in the early sixties, are now also involved in drug 
producing and trafficking operations. The third group is a rightwing paramilitary group 
known as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) with almost twenty five 
years of existence. Although they demobilized in 2003 and some heads were extradited to 
the United States, some cells mutated into drug- dealing groups and are still active in the 
conflict. All three groups besides engaging in direct fight with the national army also 
perpetrate crimes against the civil population, private assets and public infrastructure. In 
                                                            
8 Confecamaras is the Chamber of Commerce Association where all formal firms are registered and follow 
certain regulatory standards. 
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addition to drug production and trafficking9, the armed groups finance themselves by 
extortive kidnapping, although in some cases they kidnap for political motives.   
The information on the conflict used in this research comes from a balanced panel at the 
municipality level from 1988-2004. This data set has been collected along the years through 
different sources by the CEDE at Universidad de los Andes.10 It contains information on all 
attacks carried out by guerillas and paramilitary groups; as well as deterrence and defensive 
actions taken by the government during this period of time.  
The measure of conflict used in this research will be the total number of attacks carried out 
by the armed groups against the civil population, its private assets or public infrastructure. 
Specifically, the total number of attacks will be the sum of explosive terrorist attacks, 
arsonist terrorist attacks, private property assaults, entity terrorist attacks, political terrorist 
attacks, route blocking, armed contact, ambushes, harassing, population incursions, other 
terrorist attacks, land piracy and illegal road blockings. Conflict is widespread all over the 
country and it varies in intensity across regions.  
The average rate of attacks per 100,000 inhabitants in all the municipalities in Colombia is 
depicted in Figure 1. This measure significantly increased after 1999 and only appears to 
start to decrease in the year 2004. Such pattern is consistent with the onset of President 
Uribe’s first term when the country was in a deep civil war and both guerrilla and 
paramilitary groups were active and very strong. In this context, his government established 
the Democratic Security program, which included a strong military program to fight armed 
groups and proved to be successful in his first term in office.   
                                                            
9 For a detailed description of the Colombian conflict please refer to Echandía (2006) and Sanchez et al. 
(2005). 
10 Data was collected from the Vicepresidencia de la Republica, Departamento Nacional de Planeación 
(DNP), Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE), Policía Nacional, Departamento 




As previously mentioned, with the available information we can discriminate who 
perpetrated any given attack. As presented in Panel D in Table 1 most of the attacks have 
an unknown perpetrator (an average of 1.83 attacks on average per year), followed by 
attacks by the two guerilla groups (an average of 0.26 attacks), the paramilitaries (0.04 
attacks) and common crime (0.027 attacks). For all of them, except for those attacks with 
unknown perpetrator, the standard deviation is more than three times its mean value. Panel 
E of Table 1 presents the average polarization of the conflict in the study period. As 
previously explained, we define a municipality is polarized if more than 50%, 70% and 
90% of the attacks experienced in a given year are perpetrated by the same armed group. In 
this manner, we define a polarization index, an index of 50%, indicates that half of the 
attacks are perpetuated by one group, meaning that there is more than one armed group in 
the municipality. If the index is 90%, then more than 90% of the attacks are committed by 
only one group, implying that there is only one strong group in the region. Almost 92% of 
the observations are in regions in which more than 50% of the attacks are committed by a 
single group. Moreover, 79% and 35% of the observations are in municipalities where 70% 
and 90% of the attacks are perpetrated by a single armed group respectively. This suggests 
that the Colombian conflict is highly polarized.  
 
As explained, our last question of interest is whether different attacks targets affect in a 
differential manner firm exit decisions. Panel F of Table 1 separates the total attack rates 
into two broad groups. The first one encompasses all attacks that target private property 
while the second one group all terrorist attacks towards the government or the civil 
population. As can be observed on average there are much more random terrorist attacks 
than attacks directed to private property. Specifically, while on average each year there are 
1.24 terrorist attacks per municipality this number is 0.4 for property attacks.  
Finally, this same table presents the average antinarcotics operations as well as the number 
of drug laboratories dismantled by the army, navy or the national police. On average there 
are 7.21 antinarcotics operations in each municipality and 1.19 laboratories dismantled per 
year. As it will be explained in more detail later, these variables are of interest because they 
will be used as instruments for the total attack rate given that they proxy for deterrence 
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actions from the government. As previously mentioned, all Colombian armed groups use 
drug production and distribution as a major financing source. Hence, higher values of such 
operations will necessarily be associated with a higher presence of government, police 
forces and criminal groups in the municipality. This in turn will imply that deterrence 
actions should be highly correlated with armed conflict measures.  
3.3. Municipal controls: 
After merging the data sets described above, we included additional variables that could 
help us control for some fixed characteristics at the municipality level different from the 
level of violence. Among them we include the town surface with an average of 800 square 
kilometers and an average distance of 60 kilometers to the largest city in the municipality. 
Additional descriptive statistics of these variables are presented in Table 1.  We also 
include information that varies both at the municipal level and overtime such as: 
government transfers received by each municipality and GDP levels of the State for each 
year. Their most relevant statistics are also presented in Table 1.  
4. Estimation Strategy 
There are several channels through which armed conflict could interfere in the productive 
and commercial activities of the plant.  One of the most named channels is that of 
uncertainty or fear. Fear could naturally reduce investment in both labor and capital, like 
Pshisva and Suarez (2010) suggest. As documented by Ibañez and Velez (2005) armed 
conflict could also affect plants’ employment if laborers flee the region due to the fear of 
being killed. In some cases, it could also happen that some civilians may even join the 
armed groups if they are offered higher wages than those obtained in the legal market. To 
summarize, the amount of labor supply could vary in different ways: it could depend on the 
rate of within and between forced migration. Plants located in urban areas of municipalities 
which have migration from rural to urban areas will see their labor force increase. Plants 
located in areas where migration happens from rural and urban areas to other municipalities 
could see a reduction in their labor force.  
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Another direct impact of conflict may be related with changes in operational costs. It is 
plausible to imagine situations in which plants that are located in a violent area would need 
to increase security if private property is subject to acts of violence. In such cases either 
additional guard(s) or security systems need to be hired or implemented. Likewise, it could 
be the case that armed groups charge private firms extortion payments with the threat that if 
they are not paid, direct terrorism acts could be aimed at the firms. Theoretically, such 
possibility has been previously analyzed by Konrad and Skaperdas (1998).11  
Indirect effect for the firms may be numerous too. From the demand side, previous authors 
such as Verwimp and Bundervoet (2008) have shown that households’ consumption growth 
is reduced under conflict. Hence, it is no surprise that demand for products or services 
produced by the firms could be reduced and hence probably production and sales would 
decrease too. Moreover, the reduction in investment, production and sales could in turn 
reduce the number of laborers plants will want to hire. Finally, another indirect effect that 
could take place is an increase in credit costs or a reduction in available loans to firms. It is 
plausible that banks will be willing to lend money to firms located in violent regions only at 
higher rates so that the higher risks that such loans entail are covered. In extreme cases 
banks will simply close all the credit lines for such regions. 
Through their influence in capital investment, labor hiring opportunities, changes in costs 
of production and effective customers’ sales armed conflict  have a significant effect on a 
plant’s exit decision. Camacho and Rodriguez (2012) formalize these ideas using a simple 
model of firms’ decisions under a Cobb-Douglas production function. Based on it is simple 
to obtain that the reduced form of firm i exit decision in time t will be given by: 
݁ݔ݅ݐ௜,௧ ൌ ݂ሺܸܣ௜,௧, ݓܮ௜,௧, ݎܫ௜,௧, ݒ݅݋௠,௧ሻ    (7) 
                                                            
11 Specifically, for Colombia a recent example of such bribes is that supposedly made to Blockbuster by a 
guerrilla group. The multinational company refused to pay them the demanded bribe and on January 27th 2009 
a bomb in one of its stores was exploded in Bogota. (More details in El Tiempo, January 28th 2009 
“Autoridades atribuyen a extorsión atentado que dejó dos muertos en Bogotá”)  
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Where VAi,t represents the value added of the firms production in year t, wLi,t is the firms 
nominal wage paid to laborers and rIi,t represents nominal investment in year t. Finally, 
viom,t represents our variable of interest related to the conflict in municipality m where the 
plant is located in year t. This is the basic structure that all the estimations presented in this 
paper will have; the main difference across them is the specific representation that the viot 
variable takes. Specifically, we will have four different specifications depending on the 
question of interest. 
In the first specification we will use the same variable as in Camacho and Rodriguez (2012) 
in which viot represents the total number of attacks in a given municipality in year t and 
will serve as our baseline model.  In a second exercise viot will represent the total number 
of attacks perpetrated by the five possible different groups in the municipality that could 
perpetrate the attacks, namely FARC, ELN, AUC, common delinquency and unknown. The 
third exercise has as variable of interest the effect of polarization of the conflict on firms’ 
decisions. Hence viot represents a dummy variable equal to one if a given percentage of the 
attacks experienced in a given municipality in year t were perpetrated by the same armed 
group. These percentages will be 50, 70 and 90% respectively. Finally in the fourth 
exercise viot will represent the total number of attacks having as target private property or 
random terrorist attacks.  
 The use of the unique data described in Section 3 will allow us to use panel data techniques 
to answer our question of interest. As it is well know, this technique is highly valuable 
given that, among other things, it allows the researcher to control for all the constant 
unobservables that could affect the outcomes of interest. For our specific case, panel data 
techniques could for instance control for the managerial abilities or political affiliation of 
the owners of plants that will indeed influence the decisions taken and hence the results 
attained by them. This will improve the quality of our estimations.  
Specifically, the simplest specification that we estimate is given by: 
ݕ௜,௠,௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵݒ௠,௧ ൅ ߚଶ݀௜,௠,௧ ൅ ߚଷݔ௠,௧ ൅ ߚସ ௜݂,௠,௧ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ߜ௜ ൅ ݑ௜,௠,௧   (8) 
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Where ݕ௜,௠,௧ represents the exit decisions for plant i located in municipality m and at time t. 
The variable ݒ௠,௧ represents the violence or armed conflict that took place in municipality 
m and at time t as explained above. We include ݀௜,௠,௧  as a variable that captures duration of 
the plant in the panel. The vector ݔ௠,௧ represents constant and time varying municipal 
characteristics such as the municipality area, the distance to the main city in the 
municipality, the GDP of the state, and transferences from the Central Government. The 
vector ௜݂,௠,௧ represents plant characteristics changing over time, such as nominal 
investment, total nominal wages paid and added value all of which come from our 
theoretical model. Finally, t and i represent year and plant fixed effects respectively and 
ݑ௜,௠,௧  is an error term assumed to be orthogonal to plant exit. 
Under specification (8), 1 is the coefficient of interest which will give an estimate of the 
effect that the different characteristics of armed conflict has on plant exit. However, one 
must be cautious when interpreting this result given that reverse causality and endogeneity 
could be biasing our estimation of 1.   
 Several studies have previously shown that economic activity is an important determinant 
on the onset and duration of civil conflict. Among some of these studies we find Collier and 
Hoeffler (2002), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Miguel et al. (2004) all of which, using 
cross-country information, have found that levels and growth rates of GDP have a negative 
effect on armed conflict measures. There are many channels through which such reverse 
causality could emerge. For instance, lower economic activity may be associated with 
fewer labor opportunities or lower wages for young men. Under such scenarios it would be 
easier for armed groups to recruit new members and an escalation of the conflict could take 
place. Another possibility is that plant’s location is endogenous to levels of violence.  A 
plant will take into account violence conditions when deciding whether to open business or 
not. In this manner, one could expect that the strongest or more able plants to face conflict 
will open and stay in the market.  
For the reasons previously explained we must take into account the possibility of 
endogeneity in our conflict measure vm,t.  Studies such as Collier and Hoeffer (2002) and Fearon 
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and Laitin (2003) have previously used lagged independent variables to solve reverse causality 
problems between economic activity and armed conflict. However, the problem with this 
approach is that if there is any inertia in the armed conflict measure or in economic activity 
lagged measures of the former, this methodology will not necessarily solve the endogeneity 
problem.  
For this reason we use an instrumental variables approach in which we explain the armed 
conflict present in municipality m at time t with lagged laboratories dismantle 1,1 tmz  and 
antinarcotics operations 1,2 tmz in municipality m at time t-1. Our first stage will be given by 
the following equation: 
ݒ௠,௧ ൌ ߲଴ ൅ ߲ଵݖଵ௠,௧ିଵ ൅ ߲ଵݖଶ௠,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ݀௜,௠,௧ ൅ ߚଷݔ௠,௧ ൅ ߚସ ௜݂,௠,௧ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ߜ௜ ൅ ݑ௜,௠,௧	(9) 
Where violence in municipality m, at time t is explained by all the exogenous regressors. 
We used these two instruments for two main reasons. First, the dismantle of laboratories 
and antinarcotics operations rate in municipality m at time t-1 should be highly correlated 
with armed conflict given that it serves as a measure of both the presence and effectiveness 
of the Government to counteract criminal activity in the region. That is, we would expect to 
find a negative association between this government’s deterrence measure and armed 
conflict intensity, as will be shown in our first stage regression. However, note that both 
variables are related to drug production which is known to be the main financing source of 
the Colombian armed groups. Hence, if these groups try to protect such laboratories or 
production sites through armed attacks, it could also be the case that a positive relationship 
between armed conflict and such deterrence measures could emerge. The second reason 
behind our choice of instruments is that we believe on their exogeneity. It is hard to state 
that production and commercial decisions of managers today will be based on these specific 
central government deterrence decisions which are normally secret operations that occur in 
environments not easily detected by the civil population.    
It should be noted that the paper by Angrist and Kugler (2008) gives further support for our 
instruments. In their study, the authors find that indeed an exogenous upsurge in coca 
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cultivation increased violence in the regions where it was produced. They explain that a 
possible mechanism through which this takes place is by the resources that drug production 
gives to Colombian armed groups. Furthermore, the authors also find little evidence to 
suggest that increased coca production benefited economic activity in the producing 
regions. Although the income of some rural dwellers increased, they argue that regional 
economies are not closely related to the drug business and that most of the resources from 
this activity go directly to the insurgent hands. Given that manufacturing is clearly a more 
urban and legal activity it is even harder to find channels through which antinarcotics 
deterrence actions should influence plant exit decisions.  
 The instrumental variable approach is our preferred estimation strategy not only because it 
addresses the endogeneity problem directly but also because it could reduce any possible 
bias due to measurement errors or omitted variables. Of course both requirements for a 
good set of instruments will be tested empirically. That is we will need to prove that both 
deterrence measures are strongly related with our variable of interest and that they are 
exogenous to plants’ exit decisions.  
5. Results  
General armed conflict and firms’ exit decisions 
Different specifications of equation 8 are presented in Table 2 as we gradually include 
controls into the regression.12 The first six columns are the OLS estimates related with 
contemporaneous measures of armed conflict while the last six relate with IV estimates. 
Column one only includes as controls the duration variable as well as plant and year fixed 
effects; the second column adds the municipal controls described above; and the last 
specifications include all the set of controls by gradually adding plants’ specific 
characteristics that arise from the model described in Camacho and Rodriguez (2012). Even 
                                                            
12We decided to use data only from those plants that have information from all our control variables. That 
leaves us with 35,000 observations to be able to compare the coefficient of interest across specifications. 
Nonetheless, results are maintained using the complete sample in specifications that do not include all control 
variables. All of them are available upon request.  
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though we are controlling for fixed effects at the plant level the inclusion of constant 
municipality characteristics is possible given that out of the 12,714 plants, 862 of them 
changed location during the period under study.  
As shown in the OLS specifications presented in Table 2, the intensity of conflict appears 
to have no effect over plant exit. All coefficients of interest in these regressions are actually 
zero.  However, as described above, these results need to be interpreted with caution given 
the possible reverse causality that can exist between economic activity and armed conflict. 
The last six columns of Table 2 try to address the problem of endogeneity using an 
instrumental variable approach. Specifically, we evaluate the effect that armed conflict 
measures, instrumented by lagged laboratories dismantle and antinarcotics operations at the 
municipality level have on entrepreneurial activities. This is our preferred strategy not only 
because it directly addresses the endogeneity problems but also because any bias due to 
omitted variables or measurement errors will also decrease.  
Our instruments, laboratories dismantle and antinarcotics operations of the previous period 
influence in a significant manner the level of armed conflict in the municipality 
independently of the controls used. Moreover, the F-test, presented in the second panel 
from Table 2, shows that under these specifications we will not suffer from any weak 
instrument problem. Additional to the relevance of the instruments, we also need to address 
the exogeneity of our chosen instruments and the endogeneity of the armed conflict 
measure in the exit specification. Both of these questions are answered in the second panel 
of Table 2 which presents the results for the Sargan and endogeneity test of the instruments 
and armed conflict respectively. In the former test the null hypothesis is that, assuming that 
one of the instruments is exogenous, the second one is also exogenous. None of the Sargan 
tests from different specifications in Table 2 reject the null hypothesis under a reasonable 
significance level. The null hypothesis of the endogeneity test is that the armed conflict 
measure is an exogenous variable in the empirical specification and hence no IV procedure 
should be needed. In this case however, we reject such hypothesis in all specifications with 
a one percent confidence level implying that an IV estimation is indeed needed.   
  
  20
The results of the second stage for the exit decision of plants are presented in the last six 
columns of Table 2. Under the two stage procedure we can observe that armed conflict has 
a positive and significant effect on plant exit. Column one shows that after controlling only 
for plant fixed effects, year effects and duration of the plants, the hazard rate that of a plant 
exiting the market increases in 6.1 or 5.5 percentage points with a one standard deviation 
increase in the total attack rate or evaluated at the mean respectively. Alternatively, this 
amounts to a change in 0.3 and 0.28 standard deviations respectively, which is clearly not a 
small effect. Of course, it is worth noting that this coefficient may be biased given that 
there could be characteristics at the municipality level that are constant or vary over time 
and may be correlated both with plant exit decisions and with armed conflict. To reduce 
these possible sources of biases column two includes municipality characteristics that are 
constant as well as some that vary over time. As it can be observed, there was a significant 
bias in the coefficient given that it reduces in nearly 26%. However, it remains 
economically important and highly significant. Specifically, it is estimated that an increase 
in one standard deviation of our armed conflict measure increases the probability that a 
plant will exit the market by 0.22 standard deviations.  
Given that we control for year and plant fixed effects, and for municipality characteristics 
that proxy for the potential size of the markets, as well as economic activity and poverty 
levels, we can say that the effect observed in column two corresponds to the impact of 
armed conflict on plant exit decision. By adding the plant’s control variables we can 
disentangle some of the channels thorough which this effect may take place. Under the last 
specification that includes all control variables we find that an increase in one standard 
deviation of armed conflict increases the probability of plant exit by 0.28 standard 
deviations.  
Specific armed conflict characteristics and firms’ exit decisions 
Results presented in Table 2 describe the effect of armed conflict on firm exit decisions 
regardless of its characteristics. However, the interest of this paper is to understand how 
different characteristics of armed conflict decisions may differentially affect firm exit.  
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The first characteristic we take into account is the armed group that perpetrates each attack. 
As it was previously mentioned, during the period of 1993 and 2005, there were three main 
actors in the Colombian armed conflict: two left wing guerilla groups (FARC and ELN) 
and a right-wing paramilitary group (AUC). According to the different nature of these 
groups, it could be possible to expect that the objectives (among the conflict actors, the 
businesses sector and civil agents) and types of terrorist attacks perpetrated vary among the 
three groups. In a similar manner, it is possible that the civil society and the entrepreneurs 
see and relate to the three groups in different ways. As a result of this, the firm’s exit 
decisions could vary according to which actor of the conflict commits the attacks in a given 
municipality.  
 
The data availability allows us to observe these differences, analyzing as variable of interest 
the number of attacks committed by each of the three groups: AUC, FARC, ELN, and a 
fourth and fifth categories, common crime and unknown actor. Following the described 
estimation strategy Table 3 presents the results under OLS and the IV methodology which 
controls for the endogeneity problems. In each model we evaluate the effect of the number 
of attacks by 100,000 inhabitants perpetrated by each of the mentioned armed groups on 
firm exit decisions. As in Table 2, we estimate the model gradually including the different 
municipality and firm level controls, but in this case we only present the most complete 
estimation.13  
 
The results are quite interesting and show that there are heterogeneous effects on firm exit 
decisions according to which actor of the conflict perpetrates the attack. As it is observed 
on Table 3, the attacks committed by the AUC do not have a significant effect. Moreover 
they do not appear to be endogenous and hence no IV methodology is needed.  This might 
be an expected result given that this group has been historically associated with the richest 
population (landowners and entrepreneurs) and hence do not traditionally attack them. In 






On the contrary, attacks conducted by the two guerilla groups or common delinquency do 
affect firm exit significantly. Specifically, we see that an increase in a one standard 
deviation in the attacks rate by FARC increases by standard deviations the probability of 
plant exit. Nonetheless this result needs to be taken with caution. First the coefficient is 
significant at the 11 percent significance level. More importantly, the F test suggests that 
the instruments may not be the most appropriate ones and that we may be suffering from a 
weak instrument problem. For the other three groups we do not have this problem given 
that the instruments are all highly relevant, assuming one is exogenous the other one is 
exogenous too and the variable of interest was indeed endogenous. For ELN attacks we see 
that an increase in one standard deviation increases firm exit probability in 0.36 standard 
deviations. Similarly, an increase in one standard deviation in the attacks perpetrated by 
common criminals or unknown groups increase the probability of firm exit by 0.22 and 
0.23 standard deviations respectively.  
 
Table 4 presents the results associated with the levels of polarization of the conflict for 
municipalities with an index of polarization of higher than 50%, 70% and 90% 
respectively. For each level of polarization three models are presented. The first one 
presents the result for OLS with all control variables, model 2 presents the IV results with 
only plant and year fixed effects, while model 3 presents the IV results incorporating all 
control variables. For this last specification it is important to notice that the deterrence 
instruments chosen are appropriate in the sense that the F test is sufficiently high so there is 
no evidence of weak instruments being present. Similarly the Sargan test is passed and the 
polarization variables are indeed endogenous.  
 
It is interesting to note that there appears an inverse relationship between the polarization 
index and the probability of firm exit. Using all municipalities where 50% of armed attacks 
are perpetrated by one single armed group we find that an increase in one standard 
deviation in the number of attacks increases the probability of firm exit in 0.3 standard 
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deviations. This number changes to 0.23 and 0.09 when the polarization index is 70% and 
90% respectively.  
 
The last source of heterogeneous effects that we evaluate is whether different types of 
attacks affect the firm’s exit decision in a specific manner.  We analyze two types of 
attacks, attacks on property and regular terrorist attacks. One could expect the effect of 
attacks on property to be more significant, taking into account that they are directed 
towards capital and infrastructure, while terrorist attacks are aimed at alarming civil society 
as a whole. The results are shown in Table 5, where, as before, we include estimations 
following the approach of OLS, instrumental variables and gradually including regression 
controls. As in the previous regressions the instruments prove to be relevant and the 
variable of interest is endogenous. In this case however it should be noted that we reject the 
null hypothesis that if one of the instruments is exogenous the other one also is. Having this 
caveat in mind it can be seen, that the effects of property-aimed attacks are greater than 
terrorist attacks. Specifically, an increase in one standard deviation on the rate of attacks on 
property increases the probability of firm exit in 0.33 standard deviations. If the attack is a 
terrorist attack as defined in the data section the increase in the hazard of exit is of .024 
standard deviations. 
6. Conclusions 
Using a combination of two unique data sets this paper estimates the effect that different 
characteristics of the armed conflict have on exit decisions of manufacturing plants in 
Colombia. Having one of the longest ongoing civil conflicts in the world, Colombia is a 
good country to analyze this subject. Under an instrumental variable methodology, which 
controls for possible endogeneity problem, we find that armed conflict has a significant 
effect in the exit decisions of the plants. Specifically, an increase in one standard deviation 
in the number of guerrilla and paramilitary attacks in a municipality increases the 
probability of plant exit in 5.5 percentage points or 0.28 standard deviations. However, it is 
important to take into account that our results cannot be generalized for all plants in the 
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country, but only for those in with more than 10 employees and in the manufacturing 
sector.  
Regarding other interesting heterogeneous effects, we find that the effect of the armed 
conflict on firm’s exit decisions is different when the attack is committed by a guerrilla 
groups compared to the right wing paramilitary. Also, the effects are stronger in 
municipalities where the index of polarization is lower, meaning that there is more than one 
strong armed group. Finally, we find that the effects on firm exit are higher when the 
perpetuated attacks are directed towards property rather than regular terrorist attacks aimed 
at alarming the civil society. 
The present research is a first step to fill an important gap in the conflict and economy 
literature. Contrary to previous studies that are based on cross-country information or 
aggregate variables such as GDP growth, we are able to understand which and how plants’ 
decisions are influenced by an armed conflict. These first results contribute to the 
understanding of the possible direct channels through which conflict influences economic 
activity. The results of this paper can also enrich governments’ and NGOs’ knowledge in 
order to design suitable policies that aim to counteract the negative consequences of war 
and reduce its negative impact on development. The results suggest that special attention 
should be given to manufacturing plants in area with prevalent common crime, strong 
guerilla presence, and where there is less polarization of conflict.  
This is a very young research question and hence further research is needed to understand 
the effect of conflict over other important entrepreneurial decisions and the specific 
channels that may drive the results here found. Among them we should mention the effect 
on capital stock and investment decisions, the number of employees hired at the plants, the 
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Table 5: Effect based on Type of Attack
Property Terrorism
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Total Attack Rate 0.008 0.193** 0.335*** 0.006 0.061 0.240**
(0.008) (0.096) (0.130) (0.007) (0.118) (0.106)
F-test 59.66 30.53 53.27 62.10
Hansen(p-value) 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.03
Endogeneity(p-value) 0.04 0.01 0.63 0.02
R2 0.07 -0.00 -0.04 0.07 0.03 0.04
Observations 35,506 34,912 34,912 35,506 34,912 34,912
Estimation method OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Note: Standardized coefficients presented. F-test corresponds to the F statistics of the excluded instruments in the first
stage. Hansen(p-value) and Endogeneity(p-value) corresponds to the p-value associated to the Hansen, that proves ex-
ogenity of instruments, and the Endogeneity test, that proves exogeneity of the endogenous variable, respectively. All
estimations include firm and year fixed effects. Columns (2) do not include additional covariates, while columns (1) and
(3) include all group of covariates listed in Table 1. *p-value< 0.1, **p-value< 0.05, ***p-value< 0.01.
32
